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Geopolitics of Denial: Turkey’s ‘Armenian Problem’  
  The nation building project in Turkey has been a long process of organized eradication, 
forgetting and denial of the identities of the non-Turkish ethnic communities of Anatolia. The 
Anatolian Armenians were one of the first ethnic groups among those whose existence was 
regarded as a threat to the territorial integrity and existential identity of the late Ottoman State. 
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the nationalists attempt bridge the gap between 
ethnicity and territoriality in the settlement of the Turkish national identity within a 
homogenized space that manifested itself by a series of sustained policies of demographic 
engineering, re-inventing history, ethnic cleansing and suppression of the non-Turkish people 
of the Anatolian lands.1 In the eyes of the founders of the Turkish nation-state any internal or 
external interference in the construction of the imagined continuity between history, territory 
and national identity posed a constant existential threat to the ‘indivisibility and integrity’ of 
the Turkish national sovereignty. 2  This existential anxiety is still an important factor that 
persists in different discursive forms of utterances, speech acts, and defensive claims in the 
state-mentality of the Turkish society and institutions. ‘Turkishness’ in today’s Turkey is still 
a dominant official identity of the state but this dominance has not necessarily been a secure 
one. The official denial policies of the Turkish governments as a strategy of nation building is 
still an integral part of the official state ideology.  
     The aim of this article is to understand and explain the underlying official policies of the 
Turkish diplomatic statecraft in the form of sustained denial policies deployed by the 
diplomatic state craft and geopolitical reasoning through practices of banalization and 
normalization of the sufferings of the Anatolian Armenian communities. The denial in this 
sense can be treated as a form of racism that others the victims of the state violence as a 
collective ethnic or religious entity. For the purposes of this article, I will focus on this form of 
state sponsored racism distinguishing it from other forms of societal and individual racisms 
that are not necessarily endorsed or mediated by the state. In a state sponsored racism, racist 
discourse is produced and re-produced by diplomatic and geopolitical state craft to sustain the 
continuity between state sovereignty, cultural racial identity, history and territorial space as a 
defensive ideology.3 In this sense, racist discourse in its subtle and unsubtle forms manifests 
itself as a permanent process of defending the nation.4   
 From collective amnesia to the emergence ‘the Armenian Problem’ 
 For most of the Republican period, at least until mid-1960s, the state elites, diplomats, media 
and historians in Turkey maintained a collective social amnesia and largely ignored the crimes 
committed against the Armenian populations as an integral part of the Turkish history. The 
breaking out that silence came about as a reaction to the external events beyond the control of 
the Turkish state.5  In 1965, the Armenian diaspora for the first time in Lebanon commemorated 
the 50th anniversary of the atrocities committed against the Armenians of The Ottoman 
Empire. The first crack in the wall of the Turkish collective amnesia of silence, however, started 
to appear following the Armenian militant groups attacking the Turkish diplomats and 
embassies abroad by Armenian diaspora military organization ASALA in the 1970s. These 
attacks prompted the Turkish government to provide training for Turkish diplomats and 
officially encourage historians and the intellectuals of the state craft on how to respond to 
questions on the Armenian claims of genocide. 6 It should be noted that by the concept of 
‘intellectuals of statecraft’ I refer to a whole community of state bureaucrats, leaders, foreign 
policy experts, historians  diplomats and advisers who have claims to ‘expert opinion and 
legitimate knowledge’ regarding the Armenian ‘problem’. In the Turkish context, these so 
called officially endorsed intellectuals of the state craft are deployed in the service of 
geopolitical reasoning and ‘raison d’etat’ to bridge the geopolitical gap between the Turkish 
state, history and territory and national identity. The intellectuals of the diplomatic statecraft 
are not only involved in discursive practices; they also have the positional power within 
institutions to influence and inform the activities and policies of the state. 7 In this context, I 
treat discourse not just as language and grammar but as a constructed link between language 
and practice. I am mainly interested in the production of geopolitical codes in the Turkish 
official discourse of denial and how this discourse informs and is formed by Turkey’s grand 
state strategy. In this sense discursive statements must be distinguished from ordinary 
narratives. The state practice only makes sense in the light of discursive formations as regimes 
of truths in different settings. Discursive formations function as strategies to construct grand 
strategies and often masquerade as geopolitical ideologies. 8  In the next section, I will pose the 
questions: What disciplinarian language does one speak with claims to truth? From which 
official position of power does one talk? In the following, I will try to outline the key, but 
necessarily exhaustive, narratives approaching to the question of Armenian Genocide. Some 
of these are disciplinarian practices while other are more discursive in their nature. 9 
     
            If we accept the anthropological view that all knowledge is a situated knowledge, 
reflecting author’s own position and experience leading to this publications may also be a 
necessary scholarly exercise.  In the early 1980s, I was a student at Faculty of Political Science 
in Ankara. After a competitive internal exam I secured a place in the Diplomacy and 
International Relations Department where most of the Turkish diplomats were trained to enter 
into the diplomatic service.10   It was during this time when we were instructed to attend newly 
introduced ‘the Armenian Question’, Ermeni sorunu in Turkish seminar series in the faculty. 
Since all dissident academics were dismissed by the Military government these were convened 
by the senior or retired ambassadors.  In the 1980s, a substantial body of pamphlets also started 
to emerge, in both and Turkish, using Ottoman sources, with titles like Documents on Ottoman 
Empire. These were not attempting to write a critical history but polemical documents mainly 
sponsored and published by the Turkish government and institutions of the state to encounter 
Armenian claims. Some of them simply were selectively reproduced copies of Ottoman 
Documents.11 These publications largely are intended to claim that the Ottoman Government 
deported the Armenians from the war zones for security reasons and the regime went to 
considerable trouble to protect the lives and the properties of the Armenians. We had to study 
these documents published by the state institutions to learn the official position of the State. 12 
Whenever a critical dissent was raised during these seminars we were told by our instructors   
that our job as trainee diplomats was to serve the national interest not to question the official 
line. This was however in the authoritarian period following the Military Coup d’état during 
which the dominant official discourse was to defend the state against the internal and external 
enemies of the Turkish nation. The attacks by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of 
Armenia (ASALA) had broken the official wall of silence, but not the wall of denial.  
       
 
    Relatively speaking, today, the Turkish society is much more open and pluralistic and has 
undergone many changes since then. After a long lapse on serious scholarship on the issue, the 
wall of silence started to crumble.13 In 2005, A Turkish University in Istanbul held a two day 
conference investigating the event of 2015.14  The murder of Hrant Dink (editor of the Turkish-
Armenian newspaper Agos) by nationalist vigilantes in 2007 was another turning point: it 
sparked a reaction in civil society and academia. Over the last decades, the discursive debates 
on the Armenian genocide issue have multiplied and several schools of thought proliferated 
with a high volume of publications disseminated by both sides as well as academic institutions 
and scholars. It is not the aim of this article to give an exhaustive and comprehensive survey 
of the field but identify several discursive narratives that operate within their own disciplinarian 
regimes of truth.  
 
Discursive debates 
     
G-Word15  
 
One of the most enduring controversy concerns the word ‘genocide’: the legal discourse of 
labelling the crimes committed against the Armenian communities in Anatolia. This debate 
around the criminal responsibility of the Ottoman state. The term ‘genocide’ was not used until 
the end of the Second World War.  In 1948, under the shadow of Holocaust, the UN Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide produced the official definition of 
genocide. At the core of the definition are ‘acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or 
in part a national, ethnic or racial group.’16 Two elements are crucial here. First is the question 
of the state intent: did the crime occur as a result of the systematic policy of the Ottoman State 
to commit mass murder with genocidal intent? Second, were non-combatant Armenians 
targeted as the objects of extermination in order to eliminate them all from a given territory? 
This causal link is implicit in the definition: a necessary condition for genocide to occur is 
vulnerability of a specific group and real or purported connection with threats to the security 
of the state.  So the civilian targets that make up an integral part of a religious or ethnic group 
and the structurally violent consequences of the crime, rather than an explicit or even officially 
proven ‘intent’, determines the scale and the nature of the crime. If we move beyond semantic 
discussions about the legal construction of the crime the fact still remains that whether the G-
word is used or not, makes little difference to the Armenians who suffered as a result of the 
policies and practices by the Turkish Ottoman administration. It is difficult to refute the fact 
that a substantial number of Armenian communities were subjected to a state endorsed 
atrocities committed by sponsored agencies of the state apparatus against the Armenians of 
Anatolia, including children, women and families. The causal link therefore is inherent in the 
definition: a necessary condition for a crime of this scale to occur is the existence of a 
vulnerable group belonging to a specific ethnic group and real and ostensible connection with 
threats to the integrity and security of the Ottoman state. I will return to the geopolitical 
reasoning below.  
 
   A leading legal scholar in international criminal law, Schabas rightly observes that the legal 
discourse is ‘penetrated with the elements of symbolism with the stigma attached with the 
term…the epithet of ‘denier’ often is employed not with respect to what actually happened but 
rather about the legal qualification of the events’. 17 In this context, he adds, the distinction 
between the facts and the legal construction of the crime is often blurred.18 He suggests, instead 
of ‘genocide’, the concept of ‘crime against humanity’ may provide historically and 
conceptually more representative ‘narrative that is accepted by both sides (to the extent one 
can speak of sides, given that there is a spectrum of views among Turks and Armenians) has 
been expressed frequently, most recently in the call for an intergovernmental , most recently in 
the call for an intergovernmental historical commission in the protocols on normalization of 
relations between Turkey and Armenia reached in Zurich in later 2009’19. This is directly 
related the construction of the ‘historical facts’. 
 
Historiography versus memory20    
   Who has the right authority to decide on the issue is not only confined to the labelling 
practices of the crime but also related to disciplinarian professional discursive practices. A 
leading lawyer defending the term genocide claims: ‘genocide is a matter for legal judgement, 
not a matter of historians, there is no dispute about the Armenian genocide among legal 
scholars’. 21 In an interview he argued that ‘as historians do not know law, it is quite clear that 
a number of denialist historians deny the Genocide. They don’t understand what genocide 
means, and they profess no understanding of law or have no experience in applying it, so they 
are not qualified to answer the legal question of whether or not these crimes were genocide.’ 22 
This discursive professional claim begs some pertinent questions to be answered: Who has the 
right authority to decide on the issue? Given the historicity of the crime what constitutes 
reliable and valid evidence? Where can the reliable and valid evidence to be located?  What is 
the role of an historian as a witness? Rather than addressing the nature and the responsibility 
of the crimes committed ‘the politics of labelling or framing’ has become a discursive field in 
itself. 23  
 
     What is striking, at the expense of generalization is that the general trend in these 
professional, disciplinarian debates is the lack of critical-reflectivity. Each speech act or 
utterance is being made within its own disciplinarian and professional paradigmatic practices 
with its own epistemological claims in an attempt to re-frame the issue.  If we are to grasp the 
use of historiography or legal scholarship that ties theses labelling practices with claims to 
authority, attending to the disciplinarian sites of these claims is necessary. Discursive nature of 
these narratives appear not necessarily rational but function as rationalizing practices and 
discursive claims. Each claim speaks from its own position of authority, epistemological and 
historical position and claims to expertise in a cycle of production of claims and counter-claims. 
A prominent historian, Hanioglu, for instance, who is a critical voice in Turkish historiography, 
observes that in Turkey the historian is not treated like a scholar who tries to understand what 
actually happened in history but ‘a servant who knows how to press the past through the filter 
of perfection and present it for the service of the state ideology’.24 It is seen as the task of the 
Turkish scholarship to ‘reinvent’ the history according to the demands of the state ideology.25  
This general officially conformist tradition in Turkish historiography and scholarship, except 
for some scholars: Akcam, Hanioglu, Ungor, Gocek and others who dare to speak the truth to 
power, seriously undermines the reliability of Turkish historiography in terms of academic 
honesty and integrity. The Armenian historiography on the other hand is largely absent in these 
debates.26 So far substantial critical historiography on the Armenian genocide has not really 
existed; but in recent years there has been a growing body of scholarship that is engaged with 
the documents and archives critically and innovatively.27 As Tambar observes ‘Efforts to query 
what Foucault called the politics of truth are particularly crucial in post-Ottoman geographies, 
where national sovereignty and the rights of citizenship it protected were premised on mass 
political dispossession.’28 The habitus of these disciplinarian claims and the production of 
competing epistemological truths often undermine the reliability and validity of the state 
sponsored claims but also function as discursive incitements that stands in the way of solution 
and construction of common historical narrative. 
 
  On the other hand, it would not be entirely inaccurate to suggest that professional and official 
history often ignores public memory. In his ‘On the concept of history’ Walter Benjamin, a 
Weimar intellectual, wrote that there has never been a document of civilization, which is not 
at the same time one of barbarism. While history is expressed through written texts and often 
based on archival evidence; memory lives through places and cultural symbols that evoke 
painful memories of the survivors. 29 Memory is a temporal outcome of concrete experiences 
within specific geopolitical settings and acts as the devices of collective remembrances. 30 As 
two genocide scholars Huyssen and Neuman suggested: ‘Professional historiography must 
come together with public memory to establish to truth about the past and make that truth an 
integral part of national self-understanding.’ 31 In the official Turkish historiography the 
Anatolian Armenians are portrayed as the others of the Turkey’s national history.32 The Turkish 
historiography tends to privilege official archives over the lived experiences and suffering of 
the Armenians communities and is often told through the gaze of the perpetrators. Garo Paylan, 
a grandchild of a surviving Armenian family in Istanbul, who has been elected as a member of 
Turkish Parliament recently, in response to the Turkish suggestion for the establishment of 
bilateral history commission, registers his objection: ‘my grandfather’s story is too important 
to be left to the historians. This is essentially a humanitarian issue.’33 The use of history in the 
construction of the denial policy carries its racial undertones. 
 
 Denial Discourse as a form of racism   
  Denial comes in many discursive forms in terms of speech acts, utterances and imaginations 
and fantasies of the past, each with its own historical, geopolitical and social functions.34 For 
the purposes of this article I focus on the institutional forms of denial produced, endorsed and 
disseminated by the state policies and state elites. It is not my intention to deal with individual 
denial but explore denial as a strategy of an organized diplomatic statecraft to encounter the 
legitimate humanitarian claims made by the victims. Individual deniers who exercise speech 
acts, who may have political, psychological and ideological motives are not the subject of this 
article. Individual denial mainly falls within the legalistic scholarly debates of freedom of 
speech.35 However, engaging with the individual denial can be counterproductive and may 
unintentionally function to disseminate and affirm the denial discourse. Institutional denial, on 
the other hand, have tangible societal and public consequences for the victims who suffer from 
emotional pain by the negation of their experiences. Lipstad for instance, who prevailed in a 
British court after being sued by David Irving, an individual denier of Holocaust, for calling 
him a genocide denier, resisted the idea of using law to limit the expression even of extreme 
opinion on historical issues. Lipstad, suggested: ‘I do not believe that laws against denial are 
strategically wise. They tend to make martyrs of the accused, arousing sympathy for them. 
They also render the item which has been outlawed ‘forbidden fruit’. Thus it becomes more 
enticing and appealing to certain segments of society – disaffected youth, for example’. 36 
 
  As stated earlier, the denial discourse in Turkey is mainly centred on the deportation of the 
Armenians with the claim that the official intent of the Ottoman government was to deport the 
Armenians from war zones for security reasons but not to eliminate them. Deportation 
constitutes only one of the earlier stages in the long and complex process of genocide. This 
deportation-centred view fails to represent the multidimensional dynamics of the atrocities 
committed against the Anatolian Armenians.  Recently, increasing number of scholars have 
taken a synthesised view of the mass killings as a complex process. This process oriented 
approach as a political and social phenomenon enables genocide scholarship to go beyond the 
restrictive views and limitations of the strictly legal definitions. As explained earlier, the legal 
debates are generally centred on the applicability of the legal norms and conventions focusing 
largely on the direct consequences of the state intent; process oriented approach on the other 
hand takes into account of social aspects and historical continuity and the consequences of the 
process for the contemporary societies and states. Strictly legal and narrow conventional 
definition of the genocide label tends to encourage the perpetrators or their contemporary 
deniers in their attempt to absolve of their social and moral responsibility. As Schabas puts it:  
‘The real issue concerns the possibility of the state responsibility for the atrocities. Although 
there are ongoing demands efforts to litigate historic atrocities, such as slave trade and 
persecution of aboriginal peoples, in practice they have met with little success. Concern that 
recognition of responsibility for crimes against humanity perpetrated a century ago may bring 
significant legal liability is misplaced’. 37 In general, I agree with Schaba’s scholarly view, 
however, I believe, this is not meant to suggest that the denial of these atrocities by the 
contemporary Turkish governments and the state does not carry any moral, social or historical 
responsibility.  If we follow the legal rationale of retroactivity, the criminal responsibility for 
these crimes does not necessarily fall on the shoulders of the Modern Turkish Republic. 
Paradoxically, it can also be argued that by justifying the atrocities on the basis of geopolitical 
necessity and sanctifying the genocidal actions of the late Ottoman governments, the state elites 
of the Modern Turkey seem to implicitly legitimize the continuity between the Ottoman Empire 
and the modern Turkish state identity. 38 
 
   Genocide process is driven by complex overlapping dynamics. Recent scholarship 
increasingly use structure and agency synthesis to explain the complex underlying dynamics 
of genocidal processes.39 Stanton, for instance, observed that genocidal process develops in ten 
stages: classification, symbolization, discrimination, dehumanization, organization, 
polarization, preparation, persecution, extermination, denial.40 Each genocidal process has its 
own dynamics and contextual factors. More specifically regarding the Armenian genocide, 
Ugur Umit Ungor draws our attention to three overlapping contextual developments under 
which the atrocities against the Armenians were committed: the Ottoman losses of the wars in 
the Balkans; the Military coup d’état of the Committee for Union and Progress; the outbreak 
of the First World War.41   According to Ungor, each of these overlapping factors led to the 
radicalization and violent revanchist reaction against the Armenian communities in Anatolia. 
This policy consisted of a series of overlapping processes that resulted in the intended and 
planned destruction process: mass executions of the Armenian intellectuals in Istanbul 
following in the aftermath of the Gallipoli Campaign; expropriation of the Armenian assets and 
properties; deportations across Anatolia beyond the war zones; forced assimilation; artificial 
famine zones; and destruction of the material culture. What is missing, however, in these 
sequence of processes is the final stage which is the policy of sustained denial in an attempt to 
be exempted from legal, moral and material responsibility. Denial of the genocide is indeed the 
final stage of the genocide which aims to ‘reshape history and demonize the victims and 
rehabilitate the perpetrators’.  42 It is what Ellie Weisel has described as a ‘double killing’. 
Denial aims to eradicate memory and re-construct history but also degrades the memories and 
painful experiences of the victims.43  
 
   Historical sociologist, Fatma Muge Gocek argues that denial is a multi-layered, historical 
process with four distinct yet overlapping components: the structural elements of collective 
violence and situated modernity on one side, and the emotional elements of collective emotions 
and legitimating events on the other.44  According to Gocek, denial emerged through four 
stages: the initial imperial denial of the origins of the organized violence committed against the 
Armenians commenced in 1789 and continued until 1907; the Young Turk denial of the act of 
violence lasted for a decade from 1908 to 1918; early republican denial of the actors of violence 
took place from 1919 to 1973; and the late republican denial of the responsibility for the 
collective violence started in 1974 and continues today. This last stage can only be completed 
by a social closure and reconciliation when the crimes are recognized and victims are 
acknowledged. Without this social closure the process of genocide remains unfinished. 
  
   Having explained the dynamics of the denial as the final stage of the genocidal acts, I would 
like to move on to explain the underlying official denial discourse rooted in the enduring state 
mentality of the Turkish state and governments as a racial discourse. Denial process is 
maintained by the diplomatic state craft and geopolitical reasoning through practices of 
banalization and normalization of the gross atrocities committed against and the sufferings of 
the Anatolian Armenian communities. 
 
  
  The centenary of the Armenian genocide recharged the old and new debates in Turkey. The 
resurgence of the Armenian issue and how to respond to the claims and accusations of the 
Armenian lobby and campaigners has been recently raised to the top of the Turkish diplomatic 
agenda.45 The intellectuals of the Turkish statecraft have been actively mobilized in the 
construction and production of denial discourses to confront the Armenian claims on the 
centenary of the Armenian genocide. In the remainder of this paper I will identify several 
discursive strategies that constitute the geopolitical underpinnings of Turkey’s denial politics 
as part of its grand strategy. These current intersecting discursive practices of state craft that 
inform and drive Turkey’s denial policy are: Neo-Ottoman exceptionalism; apology; just 
memory concept; decentring remembrance and memory; and finally the gradual racialization 
of the Armenian problem. 
 
Turkish Nationalism to Neo-Ottoman Exceptionalism:     
   Since the resurgence of ‘the so called Armenian genocide’ debates in the mid-1970s as an 
official problem of the state, the denial policy of the Turkish state has been a permanent feature 
of the Turkish foreign policy and diplomatic state craft.  Denial policies remain at the heart of 
the Turkish geopolitical grand strategy to construct policies to confront and defend the Turkish-
Islamic national identity. Even though the central claim ‘Turks did not commit crimes against 
the Armenians but deported them for security reasons’ persists, the ‘Armenian problem’ has 
now been placed in the context of Turkey’s Neo-Ottomanist grand strategy. Until the rise of 
the JDP to power in 2002, the Armenian problem was part of the Turkish National Security 
strategy sanctioned by the military. The recognition of the Armenian genocide is still regarded 
as a threat to Turkish national identity and security. This permanent state mentality is aptly 
explained by Akcam:  ‘The mind-set that an open discussion of history engenders a security 
problem originates from the breakup of the Ottoman Empire into nation-states beginning in the 
19th century. From late Ottoman times to the present, there has been continuous tension 
between the state’s concern for secure borders and society’s need to come to terms with human 
rights abuses.’46  This geopolitical anxiety also reflects the legal rationale undermining the 
basic premises of the freedom of speech in Turkey. The Turkish government defended 
‘genocide denialist’ Perincek’s freedom of speech in his appeal to the ECHR. In Turkey, on 
the other hand, in a ruling in 2007 against two Turkish-Armenian journalists—Arat Dink, the 
son of Hrant Dink, and Sarkis Seropyan, a Turkish court in Istanbul suspended sentences of a 
one-year imprisonment for using the term genocide; denying this right to freedom of speech in 
Turkey. 47 
 
      In Turkey, the national security mentality of the state penetrates deep into the large sections 
of society and institutions and the pendulum in the construction of Turkish national identity 
historically has swung between Turkish nationalism and Islam which is embedded in the 
geopolitical continuity of the state identity as a homogenous territorial and sovereign entity. 
Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Neo-Ottomanism new geopolitical vision has 
gradually replaced Turkish secular nationalism in Turkey’s relations with the neighbouring 
countries and beyond. The integration of the dominant Sunni Islamic identity into the national 
identity of the Turkish state has become a key feature of the grand strategy in JDP’s 
‘restoration’ of the Turkish society and institutions. The Islamization of the Turkish society 
and state, referred to as ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ (Although the JDP sometimes object to this term) 
is not new and dates back to the 1980s but was not fully developed as an integral part of the 
grand strategy of the Turkish state until the AKP regime. In this new geopolitical discourse the 
revival of the Ottoman Empire is glorified as a ‘lost paradise’. In the eyes of the JDP cadres, 
this exceptional model is not only good for new-Turkey but also for other Islamic countries. In 
this relativist human rights discourse, Turkey presents itself as the defender of the Sunni 
Muslims. Erdogan for instance accused of China, Serbia and Israel committing genocidal acts 
against the Muslims. For instance, in 2009, during the visit of Sudanese Omar Al Bashir 
indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity, Erdogan asserted in 
support of Bashir’s controversial visit ‘a Muslim can never commit suicide’.48 This statement 
underlines Erdogan and his party’s religious conservative Neo-Ottomanist ideology that is not 
particularly conducive to the recognition of the sufferings of the Christian Anatolian Armenian 
populations during the late Ottoman period. The Sultan Abdulhamid seems to be the favourite 
sultan of the ruling elites in the JDP. The reign of authoritarian Abulhamid, known as the red 
Sultan in this Hamidian era, was the period of Pan-Islamization in the Ottoman history, 
coincidentally the first state sponsored atrocities against the Armenians started in this period. 
49  
    The Prime Minister of Davutoglu, formerly in charge of the Turkish Foreign policy, has been 
the main strategist behind this neo-Ottomanist drive. His concept of ‘strategic depth’ can be 
located within this new transitional Pan-Islamist geopolitical vision.50 Strategic depth is the 
new geopolitical discourse about Turkey’s position that provides a new direction to increase 
the power of Turkey in those regions with which Turkey has privileged national interests and 
close religious and cultural ties that stem from the legacies of the Ottoman Empire as the 
protectorate of the Sunni Muslims. Davutoglu’s key argument is that the civilizational conflict 
between Christian west and the Islamic Turkey in the long run is irreconcilable, instead Turkey 
needs to increase its influence by utilizing its geostrategic location and its Ottoman legacy. 
51This policy can be clearly observed in Turkey’s foreign policy actions towards Syria. Since 
the Syrian crisis unravelled Turkey openly adopted a sectarian policy supporting the Sunni 
opposition forces against Asad regime by proxy at the expense of other Kurdish and Armenian 
minorities in the Middle East.52  Davutoglu and Erdogan’s discursive denial strategies must be 
read in the context of their own conservative Islamic habitus inspired by their own 
understanding of Ottoman history and traditions. As a project of restoration the re-construction 
of Turkish national identity accentuates its Sunni Islamic religious identity which privileges 
the experiences of the Sunni citizens of the Ottoman Empire above the other minorities. As 
Libaridian explains this transformation from nationalist to Neo- Ottomanist world view is not 
fully conducive to the recognition of the sufferings of the Christian Armenians during the late 
Ottoman Empire but indicates a discursive contextual shift in the official diplomatic state craft 
of the denial. 53  
 
Rebranding the Denial through Apology and Just memory  
 
  In 20014, Erdogan, in his official statement on the anniversary of the Armenian genocide in 
2014, offered Turkey's condolences to the grandchildren of Armenians who lost their lives in 
1915. In the statement, which was translated into nine languages including Armenian, he 
described the events of World War I as "our shared pain": "Having experienced events which 
had inhumane consequences - such as relocation - during the First World War, (it) should not 
prevent Turks and Armenians from establishing compassion and mutually humane attitudes 
among towards one another," He concluded " Regardless of their ethnic or religious origins, 
we pay tribute, with compassion and respect, to all Ottoman citizens who lost their lives in the 
same period and under similar conditions." But he also added in the statement that  it was 
"inadmissible" for Armenia to use the 1915 events "as an excuse for hostility against Turkey" 
and to turn the issue "into a matter of political conflict"54 This new official rhetoric of ‘common 
pain’ is nothing new as it has been repeatedly put forward by the intellectuals of the state craft 
but has now become the integral part of the government’s diplomatic strategy. Erdogan’s 
tactical apology reads more like an official statement rather than an attempt to engage with the 
suffering and the losses of the Armenians. The banality of this non-apology is that it trivializes 
and normalizes the Armenian trauma as part of a great geopolitical catastrophe. It removes the 
agency from the act of killing by pretending that the cause of deaths and sufferings were the 
natural outcome of this great catastrophe: the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. As he puts 
‘it is a duty of humanity to acknowledge that Armenians remember the suffering experienced 
in that period, just like every other citizen of the Ottoman Empire.’  He asserts: ‘The incidents 
of the First World War are our shared pain. To evaluate this painful period of history through 
a perspective of just memory is a humane and scholarly responsibility.’55 Regardless of the 
motivations, this apology marks an important stage in the official denial policy that the 
suffering of the Armenians was for the first time registered publicly and officially at the highest 
bureaucratic level.  
 
     On the other hand, whether this was a genuine apology is worth investigating as it has 
implications for the recognition of the crimes of the late Ottoman Empire against the Armenian 
communities.56 Recently, there has been a great interest in the speech acts of apology as a 
diplomatic tool. According to  the scholarly analysis offered by Kampf and Lowenheim, the 
speech act of apology involves three types of rituals: ‘purification – that is, asymmetrical rituals 
in which the offender issues an apology in order to purify his or her dismal past but does not 
necessarily need the approval of an offended party; humiliation – that is, asymmetrical rituals 
in which the offended party forces the offender to participate in a degradation ritual as a 
condition for closure; and settlement – that is, symmetrical rituals in which both sides strive to 
restore relations.’57  Erdogan’s ‘apology’ does not seem to be genuinely seeking reconciliation 
or approval from the victims but reads more like a speech act to ‘to purify’ the Ottoman history 
and the Muslim citizens of the Ottoman Empire. In Erdogan’s apology there is no genuine 
attempt at closure or settlement. Erdogan’s style of apology lacks humility. Despite several 
references to the common history and shared pain with the Armenian populations of the 
Ottoman Empire, there is neither concrete commitment to reconciliation nor an offer of 
establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia as a first step towards reconciliation.58 Human 
rights scholar, Marrus has also pointed out that genuine apology comprises:  acceptance of 
responsibility; acknowledgment of the wrong doing; expression of regret and remorse; and 
commitment to reparation, reconciliation and closure, all of which is omitted in Erdogan’s 
apology.59  
 
    The concepts of ‘shared pain’ and ‘just memory appear to be the key elements of the apology 
in an attempt at rebranding the denial strategy. In fact, Davutoglu, now President Erdogan’s 
appointed Prime Minister, remains the key architect behind this new passive offensive 
diplomatic state craft.  In a key article published in Turkish Policy Quarterly in 2014, referring 
to the painful memory of the Armenians, Davutoglu explains: ‘The initiative that Turkey 
launched with Armenia in 2009 is premised on eradicating this sort of mentality. The ‘just 
memory’ concept that we have frequently employed during this process is critically important 
as it highlights how history must be viewed with a one-sided memory, In order for Turks and 
Armenians what each of them has experienced, it is essential they respect  one another’s 
memory.’60 In his reproachful style Davutoglu defines the lived experiences of the Armenian 
communities during the late Ottoman Empire in an attempt to reconstruct and undermine the 
legitimacy of the Armenian claims. In his neutralizing attempt, he equates the experiences of 
the Armenian minorities during the late Ottoman period with the Muslim-Turkish citizens of 
the Empire whose ideology was habitually instated with the nationalist Union and Progress 
Party. In Davutoglu’s discourse, both parties are presented as victims. But again there is no 
obvious agency or moral responsibility indicated as if the Armenian populations had died of 
natural and inevitable causes under normal circumstances. Davutoglu’s just memory concept 
is not a tenable one, as he puts those who are in possession of the executive power with those 
victims of this executive power in the same category.  Davutoglu’s claims to historical truth is 
premised upon his perception of the clash of civilizations thesis between the Christian west and 
the Muslim west. He contends: ‘When a retrospective understanding of history centered upon 
the relocation is adopted, the emergence of two collective understandings that despise one 
another is inevitable’ In his typically occidentalist manner, Davutoglu is critical of the west : 
‘The new subject-intellectual prototype that assumed the role of spokes-person for the national 
awareness of Christian elements, attempted to equate itself with the Euro-centric understanding 
of history constructed on the foundations of Christianity.’61 Davutoglu’s manichean view is 
,however, flawed as the Ottoman rulers were not innocent victims of the western Christian 
imperialists but they were themselves the rulers of an imperial state who were trying to hold 
on to the last vestiges of another declining and disintegrating European empire at the end of an 
imperial European order in the 21st century.  In effect, the real victims were the Anatolian 
citizens of the Ottoman Empire; particularly the Ottoman Christians, Greeks, Armenians and 
others were the targets of the nascent nationalist ideology of the Union and Progress cadres. 
   
 
Decentring the remembrance 
  Decentring the remembrance and memory constitutes another element of the denial policy. 
The 24th of April carries a particular symbolic significance as a day of remembrance for the 
Armenian diaspora and communities. This was the day when the Ottoman government ordered 
the mass arrests and execution of the Armenian intellectuals in Istanbul in 1915. The Armenian 
elites and intellectuals across the Empire were arrested, tortured and finally murdered leading 
to the elimination of hundreds of Armenians across Anatolia within weeks.62 The purge of the 
Armenians in Istanbul concurred with the landings of the Ally troops in the Gallipoli. This was 
not however a pure coincidence as the Ottoman defeats had radicalized the policies of the 
Ottoman Governments leading to the extermination of the Armenians.63  As Akcam observes 
the Armenian genocide took place soon after the defeat in the east in the Sarikamis area against 
the Russian advance and the empire’s ‘struggle at Gallipoli’.64 As I am not a historian, it is not 
my aim here to investigate the link historically between these two events but explain how the 
link between the Armenian genocide and the Gallipoli commemoration is constructed by the 
current Turkish diplomatic state craft as a decentring narrative.  
    
    In Turkey, the Gallipoli campaign is conventionally remembered is integral part of the 
collective national memory as a commemorative narrative that marks the beginning of the 
Turkish national awakening against the Imperialist west. Until recently, the centenary of the 
Armenian genocide has been customarily observed on March 18 to mark the end of the naval 
campaign of the allies. In 2015, however, for the first time the Turkish government decided to 
shift the observance back to April 24 which concurred with the Armenian commemorations 
and the centennial of the ANZAC landings on 25 April 1915. Both President Erdoğan and 
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan have issued competing invitations for their respective 
events. In an interview with a French television, in response to the question regarding the 
shifting the date of Gallipoli commemoration, Erdogan said Turkey is commemorating the 
100th anniversary of the Gallipoli Battles and “we are in no position to obtain permission from 
Armenia”. “It is a date in history and it has nothing to do with the ceremonies in Armenia. 
Quite on the contrary, they fixed their ceremonies to coincide with our date.” 65  
   This decentering turn in the national commemorative exercise seems to be another deliberate 
act of rebranding the denial strategy. Erdogan’s choice of the Gallipoli commemoration did not 
just aim to marginalize the Armenian commemoration but an attempt to reframe the history. 
Erdogan’s contextualization of the Armenian suffering, among other things, is intended to 
publicize his view that the extermination of the Anatolian Armenians was a historical accident 
resulted from the chaos of First World War. According to this ‘chaos theory’ narrative, the 
Ottoman Muslims suffered as much at the hand of the Allied forces. For the Gallipoli event, 
Erdogan accentuates the religious aspect of the Gallipoli campaign. The national hero, Ataturk 
who made his reputation there and later founded the Turkish Republic, is demoted to the 
background as a marginal figure. This newly adopted discourse shifts the official history of the 
Gallipoli as a nationalist legend, known as ‘Canakkale Destani’ in Turkish , to a civilizational 
clash between the east and west.  This shift from the old anti-imperialist nationalist discourse 
to the representations of Gallipoli as a symbolic site of jihad against the Christian west 
implicitly aims to portray the Armenians as the fifth column representing the interests of the 
Christian powers within the Ottoman Empire. In the video, produced by Turkey’s presidency 
and simultaneously broadcast on several television networks late April 2014, Erdogan prays 
the troops kneeling to Mecca, and then he recites a poem:  
Do not leave this country, which was kneaded by Muslims, 
with no Muslims, my God  
Give us strength... Do not leave the field of jihad 
with no pahlevan [wrestler], My God! 
Do not leave these masses, who look for a hero, 
with no hero, My God!’66 
Decentering the denial is also closely tied to the increasing racialization of the ‘Armenian 
problem’ in contemporary Turkey.  
 
Racialization of the denial:  
   It is futile to seek historical evidence to prove that the gross crimes committed against the 
Armenian communities was motivated by racist ideology of the Union and Progress Party.  
Indeed, the Union and Progress Party initially included some prominent Armenians in its ranks. 
After all, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire lacked any ideological notion of race and ethnic 
identity.67 In the imperial order of the Ottoman Empire, the Sunni Islam was the official religion 
of the ruling classes. The so called “millet system” only recognized confessional communities, 
Armenian, Jewish and Greek Christians, ‘i.e. ‘the people of the book’, enjoyed religious 
freedom and self-rule in exchange for loyalty and taxation.68 In effect, the atrocities against the 
Armenians was essentially a destruction of a largely defenseless Armenian communities by the 
agents of the late Ottoman government for geopolitical reasons of raison d’état rather than a 
crimes motivated by strictly racist ideologies. This is not to suggest however that the 
geopolitical reasoning behind these crimes can be used to justify the atrocities. The ensuing 
denial discourse in Turkey today, in fact, serves as the indictment of the Armenian 
transgressions of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The 
crimes against Armenian communities are justified on behalf of the existence of the Turkish 
nation as a geopolitical necessity. The state of exception logic has transformed the Armenian 
genocide issue into an existential security paradigm. In this logic, geopolitical necessity trumps 
rule of law and human rights.  In effect, the racialization of the Armenian problem as the other 
of the Turkish national/religious identity has now become an integral part of the official denial 
policies. For instance, only few months after the official ‘apology’, during his presidential 
election campaign, in an attempt to lure the nationalist votes, Erdogan adopted overtly racist 
rhetoric: ‘You wouldn't believe the things they have said about me. They have said I am 
Georgian. ...they have said even uglier things -- they have called me Armenian, but I am 
Turkish.’69 In 2014, the Armenians in Turkey have become a number target of the pro-
government Turkish media.70 The hate speech is not only expressed through political 
statements and media but also disseminated through the educational institutions. Education has 
been an important vessel for   nation building process and citizenship in Turkey.71 Turkey’s 
discourse on the construction of the Armenian ‘problem’ has gone through several phases. The 
educational system through which state’s narrative is disseminated has departed from the 
earlier official silence policies to the repackaging of the denial as part of the educational 
policy.72  
   
   As Cayir, in his study of the national identity on the school text books in Turkey, has recently 
found, there are serious issues of prejudice and racial stereotyping of the Armenians as others 
of the Turkish national identity: ‘The first is that a very complex historical and political issue 
is presented from a single perspective and with a simple defensive logic. The second and related 
problem is that of the negative feelings (that can sometimes turn into violence) towards Turkish 
citizens of Armenian origin that is created by constant generalization of “Armenians” in the 
textbooks.’ From the first grade level (Grade 7), teachers are requested to pass on to their 
students ‘the state’s defensive discourse’. In the teacher’s manual for grade 7 teachers of social 
studies, for instance, teachers are instructed: ‘State to your students that the Russians also made 
some Armenians revolt on this front and murder many of our civilian citizens. Explain that the 
Ottoman State took certain measures following these developments, and in May 1915 
implemented the ‘Tehcir Kanunu’ [Displacement Law] regarding the migration and settlement 
of Armenians in the battleground. Explain that care was taken to ensure that the land in which 
the Armenians who had to migrate were to settle was fertile, that police stations were 
established for their security and that measures were taken to ensure they could practise their 
previous jobs and  professions.’73  These officially distributed educational material reconstruct 
the history in line with the denial policies of the government portraying the Armenians as the 
back stabbers and betrayers who are regarded as a threat to the sovereignty and identity of the 
modern Turkey.74  The racialization of the Armenian ‘problem’ has now become an integral 
part of the official denial strategy sponsored by the Turkish government and intellectuals of 
geopolitical state craft and sustained through the institutions of the Turkish state.    
 
Conclusions  
  Turkey’s ‘Armenian problem’ stems from its existential geopolitical anxiety regarding the 
recognition of the Armenian genocide. Since the beginning of the debate the criminal acts 
committed against the Armenian communities in Anatolia has been sanctioned by the modern 
Turkish state as a geopolitical necessity, ‘raison d’état’, which has been the outcome of the 
nation-state building process in Anatolian lands. The Republican elites made sure that the gap 
between the territory and the nation is bridged. Even the key motivation behind the atrocities 
was not originally a racial one, the denial policy has become a part and parcel of the gradual 
racialization of the general public discourse underwritten by the Turkish state.  Due to the 
external pressures, the Turkish society and state institutions had to depart from the collective 
amnesia to the gradual construction of a state sponsored denial policy. The centenary of the 
Armenian genocide in 2015 offered an opportunity to consolidate and reframe the denial 
policy which has led to the official diplomatic rebranding of Turkey’s denial policies. The 
sufferings of the Armenians are officially registered but not fully recognized. The debate on 
the Armenia in Turkey is now well beyond the reach of the state that has to face challenges 
from the civil society in its democratization process.  
     
    The context of ‘the Armenian problem’ has now shifted from the secular nationalist 
discourse and firmly embedded within the grand strategy of Neo-Ottomanist discourse in the 
foreign policy of the Islamist JDP government. The intellectuals of the Turkish diplomatic 
state craft and institutions have recently employed new discursive strategies to reframe the 
debate. These included: apology, just memory concept, decentering the remembrance and the 
gradual racialization of the Armenian problem in the Turkish education and media.  
 
     The debate on the Armenian genocide is now one of the key challenges to Turkey’s 
democratization process in the creation of a multicultural society. The opening up of the 
diplomatic relations with Armenia without any conditionality may be a step forward towards 
the reconciliation. For these reasons, there is a need to detach the debate from geopolitical 
discourses and strategies.  
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